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Article: There Is No Free Market for Electricity, Can There Ever Be?

Very interesting article about the state of the electric power system market in the US. It reviews the complicated relationship between state regulators and market stake-holders--i.e., private for-profit operators.

https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2017/05/no-free-market-electricity-can-ever/

Excerpt about consumer demand response to stabilize the power grid:
Independent System Operators (ISO) markets are also subject to regulation by officeholders working under the same capacious statutory guidelines of yesteryear—“just and reasonable” and “in the public interest”—which allow (or require) them to import ideological predilections into the mundane tasks of wholesale electric market design. For example, Jon Wellinghoff, the former chairman of the FERC and a regulator of a green bent, once declared himself a “soldier” fighting in “an epic battle” for something called “demand response”: the ability of a customer to be more participatory, rather than a passive thing represented in the market through an administratively established, inflexible, often inflated demand curve. His was a noble cause. But, ironically, the reform he implemented doubled down on the problem. The FERC retained the central administrative forecast of customer demand, and made it more complicated, divvying up the projection to particular customers. According to the FERC, if a customer, usually a large industrial or commercial user, ends up using less at a particular time, the customer is paid for the difference between its forecast and actual demand at the same price that a power plant itself would have been paid. In the words of Bill Hogan, a Harvard professor who has spent a career opining on the design of these markets, it is a policy of “I decided not to consume electricity. Please send me a check.” Not surprisingly, many businesses now specialize in demand response aggregation—grouping together customers to obtain revenues by acting as a kind of hypothetical power plant under this regulation.

If a firm derives revenue from the decisions of the regulator, then it follows that the firm will devote many resources to the regulatory process in order to maximize that revenue. This rent-seeking behavior has always been a problem for a sector dominated by regulated monopolies, but many of the new regulations, such as Chairman Wellinghoff’s, serve to expand the community of rent-seekers. At best, they merely put different communities of rent-seekers in something resembling competition with one another. That competition pivots not on attracting customers, but on persuading a regulator or an ISO of a market design that will maximize that stakeholder’s profit.

Excerpt about state renewable energy targets:
State renewable energy requirements. In addition, more than half the states have enacted renewable energy standards. These standards are a crazy quilt of requirements, calling all different types of technologies “renewable.” For example, in Montana, were one to burn scrapped, creosote-laced railroad ties in a boiler for the production of electricity, this would be classified as “renewable.” But all the standards similarly have the requirement that local utilities purchase a particular amount of “renewables,” usually on the basis of a percentage of a utility’s total sales. In California, for instance, the state requirement is 33 percent by 2020, although the president of the state’s senate has proposed increasing the requirement to 100 percent by 2050, and hastening an existing requirement for 50 percent to 2025, down from 2030. To comply with these laws, utilities and other suppliers of power must acquire a sufficient number of RECs, or renewable energy credits, which are government-created commodities equal to one megawatt-hour’s production of a qualified renewable. It all makes for a great bumper sticker—25% by ’25!—but these laws have the practical, and rather anti-conservationist, effect of introducing additional power plants into markets where they are not necessary to supply customers.

These twin policies—the federal tax credit and the state renewable standards—have led to a glut of power sluicing around the sun-soaked southwest and the windy Great Plains, and have had significant unintended consequences for the market in electric power. Wind and solar facilities, unlike coal or gas, have no variable or fuel cost. So one would think that they would bid, or be willing to take a market price, of zero or slightly more. That supposition is wrong—and not because they need a number larger than zero to make their projects pencil out. Since the IRS awards the tax credit on the basis of production, and since RECs likewise are created only when a wind farm or solar plant is producing energy, these renewable power plants have a negative marginal cost equal to the inverse of the value of the PTC plus whatever a REC is worth to a utility under state law. In other words, renewable power plants are willing to pay consumers to take their energy output, up to $23 per megawatt-hour, lest they lose out on the PTC and the piece of paper that is the REC. This is not an insignificant amount of money. Audits from one large utility, the federally owned Bonneville Power Administration, suggest that some renewable plants earn twice the amount of money from these twin government policies as they do from the actual sale of electricity.

As the amount of renewable energy grows, there are occasions when non-dispatchable energy, including renewables and other power plants that cannot easily be ramped down, such as nuclear reactors, outstrips actual customer demand. In these situations, electricity prices go negative. Thereupon an amusing game of arbitrage begins. In California, a REC is worth more—because of the state’s renewable energy policy, which is often called “ambitious”—than a REC in, say, Arizona. So when there is a surplus of solar energy in California, producers look to dump the excess on someone else to ensure they still produce a REC. Arizona may not need the power either, but its solar producers won’t accept as low of a negative price as the Californians. Thus, in the past year of trading, California solar has exported to Arizona, in circumstances where solar production there must be shut off to make room for it.
 
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