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What are the greatest mysteries that science can't explain (yet)?

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Did someone say "women" already?

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No, it still perfectly describes red. It just does not include the experience of seeing the colour red. The qualia.

That's what I mean by red - what I see when I see red. It doesn't need some fancy qualification like "qualia".

What do you mean by red if not that? (And what did you mean by red before you learned about wavelengths?)

(EDIT: In danger of becoming a role-playing thread in which you are Bertrand Russell and I am George Edward Moore or something like that)
 
Science is not about explaining things, but about seeking laws

... that explain things?

Why in the hell is this QE stuff freaking me the hell out??

Probably because it is seriously odd, or at least at odds with one or both of (a) special relativity (b) our general understanding of the universe. The same sort of freak-out you would get if it turned out that Yuri Geller's spoon-bending stuff was for real. Scary stuff that you want to understand but can't.
 
... that explain things?

That is more the field of philosophy. Science does not set out seek answers to questions of cause. For example, Newton said bodies of mass have the property of gravity but does not explain, or attempt to do so, the cause of that property.
 
So tell me this about Quantum Entanglement:

At the very least, it seems to indicate that the universe is "one thing", does it not?

...as opposed to a Newtonian "it's made up of many small, separate pieces".
 
That is more the field of philosophy. Science does not set out seek answers to questions of cause. For example, Newton said bodies of mass have the property of gravity but does not explain, or attempt to do so, the cause of that property.

I was thinking the other way around. Not so much that there need be (though there might be) an explanation of gravity, but that the law of gravity is - quite rightly - used to explain a whole ton of other stuff, like parachuting for example.
 
So tell me this about Quantum Entanglement:

At the very least, it seems to indicate that the universe is "one thing", does it not?

...as opposed to a Newtonian "it's made up of many small, separate pieces".
I haven't heard any theory branching from QE that says this.

but all of existence is a single electron moving back and forth through space and time and experiencing itself.
 
That is more the field of philosophy. Science does not set out seek answers to questions of cause. For example, Newton said bodies of mass have the property of gravity but does not explain, or attempt to do so, the cause of that property.

The fact that science describes phenomena doesn't make it incapable of explaining them. Coming up with an explanation is a part of any experiment... Or are you going to get really hung up on some particular definition of "explain" and use it to minimize the importance of the scientific method?
 
I don't think there's any real theory branching from QE that says this.

But it's a kind of natural interpretation, isn't it?

Like if one particle can affect the behavior of another particle on the other side of the room (or other side of the galaxy), then doesn't it hint at some underlying unity between the two spaces? The space between them being something of an illusion?

The other alternative is that there is some sort of method of transmission between the two particles... but I think that is considered not to be suggested by this phenomenon, which is what makes it remarkable.
 
crap.. double post.

The fact that science describes phenomena doesn't make it incapable of explaining them. Coming up with an explanation is a part of any experiment... Or are you going to get really hung up on some particular definition of "explain" and use it to minimize the importance of the scientific method?

I know we don't like it because it's a doorway for religious nonsense...

...but we can accept that there may be meanings to phenomena that won't be revealed by a scientific explanation of its mechanics?
 
The fact that science describes phenomena doesn't make it incapable of explaining them. Coming up with an explanation is a part of any experiment... Or are you going to get really hung up on some particular definition of "explain" and use it to minimize the importance of the scientific method?

There's a clear distinction between science and philosophy. When you move into examining causes you move into the field of philosophy (and theology and ethics). My observing that distinction does not make the scientific process any less important. I may be being very particular here, but I feel that's important.
 
That's what I mean by red - what I see when I see red. It doesn't need some fancy qualification like "qualia".

What do you mean by red if not that? (And what did you mean by red before you learned about wavelengths?)

(EDIT: In danger of becoming a role-playing thread in which you are Bertrand Russell and I am George Edward Moore or something like that)

:)

Probably a better way to think about it is describing the thing, and describing the experience of a thing. Before I knew what wavelengths were, I could only be given examples of what was red, and what was not red. I could not have it be described. If someone has no knowledge of the wavelengths and what they represent, or no understanding of the structure of the eye, they too can only have examples of red and not red. Before I learned about wavelengths, what I meant by red was those colours which fit within the examples I had been shown.

As for describing it to different populations, that is an inherent difficulty of humanity. How do you describe light to a blind person, or any number of objects, sensations, or concepts to people who are not equipped to experience them directly. It does not mean the description is flawed, it means the person cannot understand the description.
 
I know we don't like it because it's a doorway for religious nonsense...

...but we can accept that there may be meanings to phenomena that won't be revealed by a scientific explanation of its mechanics?

Oh, sure. There are lots of interesting things that we'll probably never understand for a whole host of reasons. I'd just like to reiterate that science not figuring some stuff out isn't the same as that stuff being off-limits and unexplainable through scientific means.
 
There's a clear distinction between science and philosophy. When you move into examining causes you move into the field of philosophy (and theology and ethics). My observing that distinction does not make the scientific process any less important. I may be being very particular here, but I feel that's important.

I think you're hinting at something like Stephan Jay Gould's Non-Overlapping Magisteria (NOMA), in which science describes "what is" in our universe, while philosophy/theology attempts to answer the "why is" or "meaning" of the objects in our universe.

I used to think it was ridiculous... but now I don't. I think in being truly open and skeptical, you come to the conclusion that science can't actually say anything about meanings. It can tell you all of the pieces of the universe, but not "why universe?"

Of course there might be no meaning, all random, all accidental... but that's an assumption.
 
But it's a kind of natural interpretation, isn't it?

Like if one particle can affect the behavior of another particle on the other side of the room (or other side of the galaxy), then doesn't it hint at some underlying unity between the two spaces? The space between them being something of an illusion?

The other alternative is that there is some sort of method of transmission between the two particles... but I think that is considered not to be suggested by this phenomenon, which is what makes it remarkable.
Yeah it's definitely a natural interpretation IMO, since they appear to be connected in some way that is deeper than what we seem capable of perceiving. If you want my opinion, I think quantum weirdness will eventually be attributed to extra dimensions (this isn't very sci-fi these days). I suspect that subatomic particles seep through the space-time 'fabric' and simply don't 'live' in the same world as us. Things can be in two places at once or communicate instantly because space-time is simply a limit on how we understand our environment. I remember a nice illustration of this concept that involved an ant crawling along a cable line. If you were watching from a moderate distance, the cable would seem two-dimension. But to the ant it's definitely three dimensional, and he may be climbing all around it like a spiral.
 
Oh, sure. There are lots of interesting things that we'll probably never understand for a whole host of reasons. I'd just like to reiterate that science not figuring some stuff out isn't the same as that stuff being off-limits and unexplainable through scientific means.
Yeah "god of the gaps" is weak.

There may be things science can't "get at", perhaps indefinitely! But it doesn't imply that it's super-natural... or how do I say this?... "non-mechanical."
 
But it's a kind of natural interpretation, isn't it?

Like if one particle can affect the behavior of another particle on the other side of the room (or other side of the galaxy), then doesn't it hint at some underlying unity between the two spaces? The space between them being something of an illusion?

The other alternative is that there is some sort of method of transmission between the two particles... but I think that is considered not to be suggested by this phenomenon, which is what makes it remarkable.

I think what this points to is some fundamental weaknesses in our understanding of the universe.

If we think in terms of particles and transmission and space and relativity it doesn't seem to make sense at all - which is either a problem with the universe or with our understanding of it. But obviously the universe is what it is, so the problem has to be our understanding. Particle physicists tend, at heart, to be reductionists - they are trying to get to the bottom of something by finding smaller and smaller things to build their understanding out of; but it's possible - maybe even likely - that there is no bottom, that it's turtles all the way down.

If instead we think in terms of processes (Whitehead kind of made a start on this in a paper in 1948 but it rather fizzled out after that) then we might stand a better chance of understanding what the universe is up to, but we run slap bang into a few problems that our understanding isn't geared up to deal with. First of all, there is no such thing as an elementary process - processes can be described or at least approximated at any level of locality or complexity and there's no rule that says a smaller process is any more fundamental than a bigger one. And second, we don't except in a few rare instances (like field theory and waves) have good mental tools or maths for describing processes.

It is all a bit of a hornswoggle.

Some physicists and chemists tend to dismiss other fields as "emergent properties" of the physical universe, but it's probably equally valid to consider physics as an emergent property of, say, elephants.
 
I think what this points to is some fundamental weaknesses in our understanding of the universe.

If we think in terms of particles and transmission and space and relativity it doesn't seem to make sense at all - which is either a problem with the universe or with out understanding of it. But obviously the universe is what it is, so the problem has to be our understanding. Particle physicists tend, at heart, to be reductionists - they are trying to get to the bottom of something by finding smaller and smaller things to build their understanding out of; but it's possible - maybe even likely - that there is no bottom, that it's turtles all the way down.

If instead we think in terms of processes (Whitehead kind of made a start on this in a paper in 1948 but it rather fizzled out after that) then we might stand a better chance of understanding what the universe is up to, but we run slap bang into a few problems that our understanding isn't geared up to deal with. First of all, there is no such thing as an elementary process - processes can be described or at least approximated at any level of locality or complexity and there's no rule that says a smaller process is any more fundamental than a bigger one. And second, we don't except in a few rare instances (like field theory and waves) have good mental tools or maths for describing processes.

It is all a bit of a hornswoggle.

Some physicists and chemists tend to dismiss other fields as "emergent properties" of the physical universe, but it's probably equally valid to consider physics as an emergent property of, say, elephants.

Whoa. It's kind of amazing to think that the fundamental level of reality is already, we can assume, thoroughly ungraspable by any conventional understanding. (and when I use words like "levels" I crash head-first into an assumption you just told me I needn't have :P)
 
I think what this points to is some fundamental weaknesses in our understanding of the universe.

If we think in terms of particles and transmission and space and relativity it doesn't seem to make sense at all - which is either a problem with the universe or with our understanding of it. But obviously the universe is what it is, so the problem has to be our understanding. Particle physicists tend, at heart, to be reductionists - they are trying to get to the bottom of something by finding smaller and smaller things to build their understanding out of; but it's possible - maybe even likely - that there is no bottom, that it's turtles all the way down.

If instead we think in terms of processes (Whitehead kind of made a start on this in a paper in 1948 but it rather fizzled out after that) then we might stand a better chance of understanding what the universe is up to, but we run slap bang into a few problems that our understanding isn't geared up to deal with. First of all, there is no such thing as an elementary process - processes can be described or at least approximated at any level of locality or complexity and there's no rule that says a smaller process is any more fundamental than a bigger one. And second, we don't except in a few rare instances (like field theory and waves) have good mental tools or maths for describing processes.

It is all a bit of a hornswoggle.

Some physicists and chemists tend to dismiss other fields as "emergent properties" of the physical universe, but it's probably equally valid to consider physics as an emergent property of, say, elephants.

So ultimately, you're making a philosophical argument that we are incapable of understanding everything. Fundamentality in physics has nothing to do with small or large processes, it has to do with the notion of what a theory encompasses. All of physics can be said to be derivable from a field theory, and that's why it is fundamental. It's got nothing to do with scale, it's got to do with the fact that nature seems to like field theory. We didn't choose to have to delve into smaller and smaller things to understand how this works, that's simply "how it is".

I don't buy that there is somehow no notion "fundamental" when you think in terms of processes. Again, this is a question of what your processes encompass. When you break down the world to the four fundamental forces, and realize that all physical actions can theoretically be derived from that, then you start to realize that you're onto something fundamental. Is there something more fundamental than these four forces that is responsible for the physics in this universe? Maybe. But as it stands, there's no reason to say there isn't, or that these processes are somehow not fundamental.

The problem I have with the reductionist accusation is that it's typically made by people who don't have a physics background, but a philosophy background. Saying that we can't know it all, that there will always be something more just out of reach, something slightly more fundamental, is tantamount to intellectually surrendering to the ephemeral nature of the physical world. Whatever is at the bottom, it is certainly not turtles, and there's no reason to think it can't be probed or understood.
 
Giorgio Tsoukalos.

lol I'm literally listening to him right now on the new ep of Joe Rogan's podcast.

So ultimately, you're making a philosophical argument that we are incapable of understanding everything. Fundamentality in physics has nothing to do with small or large processes, it has to do with the notion of what a theory encompasses. All of physics can be said to be derivable from a field theory, and that's why it is fundamental. It's got nothing to do with scale, it's got to do with the fact that nature seems to like field theory. We didn't choose to have to delve into smaller and smaller things to understand how this works, that's simply "how it is".

I don't buy that there is somehow no notion "fundamental" when you think in terms of processes. Again, this is a question of what your processes encompass. When you break down the world to the four fundamental forces, and realize that all physical actions can theoretically be derived from that, then you start to realize that you're onto something fundamental. Is there something more fundamental than these four forces that is responsible for the physics in this universe? Maybe. But as it stands, there's no reason to say there isn't, or that these processes are somehow not fundamental.

The problem I have with the reductionist accusation is that it's typically made by people who don't have a physics background, but a philosophy background. Saying that we can't know it all, that there will always be something more just out of reach, something slightly more fundamental, is tantamount to intellectually surrendering to the ephemeral nature of the physical world. Whatever is at the bottom, it is certainly not turtles, and there's no reason to think it can't be probed or understood.
I might be wrong but I think you've fundamentally misunderstood his post (in light of the topic thread title, I imagine). He was explaining issues about quantum entanglement to me... ultimately saying that there IS an understanding of it possible by science, but that it is powerfully odd and defies understanding by any conventional wisdom.
 
I don't believe you.

Go on, describe the colour red to me.

Sorry, that was a poor choice of wording.

That is - we can tell you all about the colour red... but that experience of been told is different from the experience of experiencing...

And it's because been told and direct experience are two different things.

In the case of the colour of red... it's much more difficult to be told then it is with other broader more generalizable experiences... it's like trying to explain pain to one of those people that can't feel pain.

It's a very low level thing that our language is inept at properly describing the experience of.

But the reason we experience red the way we experience it... is because it's this thing that has a static quality that can be discerned from all the other information variables that exist in our world... and that static quality is experienced relative to all the other static qualities of the world - and thus the information processing machinery is able to discern it as a thing seperate unto itself.
 
Apologies for fisking, but there's a few different points here.

So ultimately, you're making a philosophical argument that we are incapable of understanding everything.

Not really. The limits of our understanding, given the right evidence and conceptual/mathematical tools, are pretty well unexplored (and there seems no real way of exploring them in the abstract anyway). Only trying to point out that we don't by any means understand everything and there do appear to be some deep-rooted weaknesses in our understanding or our toolkit for understanding them. Whether that is down to brain capacity, education, culture, history or whatever, or whether it ultimately isn't possible to understand everything I don't really have any firm opinion on.

Fundamentality in physics has nothing to do with small or large processes, it has to do with the notion of what a theory encompasses. All of physics can be said to be derivable from a field theory, and that's why it is fundamental. It's got nothing to do with scale, it's got to do with the fact that nature seems to like field theory. We didn't choose to have to delve into smaller and smaller things to understand how this works, that's simply "how it is".

All of physics maybe, but that's not all of everything - which is what I was trying to get at. We're talking science here, not just physics. Besides, it's possible (not saying it is true, just possible) that things like the EPR paradox might slip through the net if we concentrate too much on the local.

I don't buy that there is somehow no notion "fundamental" when you think in terms of processes. Again, this is a question of what your processes encompass. When you break down the world to the four fundamental forces, and realize that all physical actions can theoretically be derived from that, then you start to realize that you're onto something fundamental. Is there something more fundamental than these four forces that is responsible for the physics in this universe? Maybe. But as it stands, there's no reason to say there isn't, or that these processes are somehow not fundamental.

Well, it depends what you mean by fundamental here. I'll buy that the four forces are fundamental to something, but that does not mean that they have explanatory value in every sphere. You won't get very far, for example, trying to explain the Abortion Act 1967 in terms of fundamental forces - or at least not in terms of those four.

The problem I have with the reductionist accusation is that it's typically made by people who don't have a physics background, but a philosophy background.

I'm lucky I guess in having both. I just argue on whichever side is more fun!

Saying that we can't know it all, that there will always be something more just out of reach, something slightly more fundamental, is tantamount to intellectually surrendering to the ephemeral nature of the physical world. Whatever is at the bottom, it is certainly not turtles, and there's no reason to think it can't be probed or understood.

Not at all. It isn't surrender, it is exploration of possibilities. And I still claim there might not be a bottom, though I do hope you realise I wasn't entirely serious about the turtles (or the elephants)!
 
That is more the field of philosophy. Science does not set out seek answers to questions of cause. For example, Newton said bodies of mass have the property of gravity but does not explain, or attempt to do so, the cause of that property.

Science is all about seeking answers to questions of cause. Philosophy will never get you to understand the cause of anything. Are philosophers going to tell you what causes some disease? No. Medical science will tell you, by running scientific experiments.
 
Science is all about seeking answers to questions of cause. Philosophy will never get you to understand the cause of anything. Are philosophers going to tell you what causes some disease? No. Medical science will tell you, by running scientific experiments.

I'll buy that. Philosophy is essentially the study of stuff that doesn't have answers (yet). As soon as a philosopher comes up with an answer or cause or whatever (a good one) it stops being philosophy and turns into something else.
 
Science is all about seeking answers to questions of cause. Philosophy will never get you to understand the cause of anything. Are philosophers going to tell you what causes some disease? No. Medical science will tell you, by running scientific experiments.

You've misunderstood my post; I did not deny sciences' ability to discover the causes of events/phenomena. There's difference between knowing causes and understanding the causes so far as we know the laws of science to which they are subject.
 
You've misunderstood my post; I did not deny sciences' ability to discover the causes of events/phenomena. There's difference between knowing causes and understanding the causes so far as we know the laws of science to which they are subject.

I don't understand. If I drop a ball, the cause of it accelerating toward the ground is gravity. Even going down a level and asking why is there gravity would be an entirely scientific question.
 
The need for a "why" is an entirely human thing. You can ask "why" for an infinite number of iterations. It's a completely pointless endeavor unless you believe in magic.

Well yeah, except that the need for a "how" is an entirely human thing as well, so I'm not convinced this line adds anything.

EDIT: actually I'm also not sure that asking "why" is utterly pointless either. Anyone for an experiment? OK - lets go. Why does the giraffe have a long neck?
 
Pyramids (Or actually, the Pyramid of Giza - it was built way too fast)
Statues on Easter Island (How they got there)
How the universe came to be
How we came to be
Consciousness
 
Well yeah, except that the need for a "how" is an entirely human thing as well, so I'm not convinced this line adds anything.

EDIT: actually I'm also not sure that asking "why" is utterly pointless either. Anyone for an experiment? OK - lets go. Why does the giraffe have a long neck?

How says "something is happening, I want to explain it"

Why assumes there is further explanation to be done beyond how.

Your example with the giraffe is a How, in the way that I am attempting to use the terms.
 
How says "something is happening, I want to explain it"

Why assumes there is further explanation to be done beyond how.

Your example with the giraffe is a How, in the way that I am attempting to use the terms.

I'm really not sure where you are coming from with this, it seems to me an artificial and probably useless distinction.

Let's say some guy shoots me in the leg. You'd say it is OK to ask him "how" he did that, to which the answer's probably something obvious like "I took the safety off, pointed the gun at you and pulled the trigger", but you somehow claim it is illegitimate or fruitless to ask him "why" he did it - which I'm probably rather keen to know?

Sounds like a load of tosh to me.

Plus, asking "how" the giraffe has a long neck is entirely different to asking "why" it does.
 
The problem with the discussion between why and how is that we're having that discussion in a high-level language and we're trying to map those words onto incredibly ill-defined terms. What does "why" mean, and how is it separate from "how"? I'm not saying its unanswerable, I'm saying I expect a lot of people answer it differently.

For me "why" is almost a useless term, because for it to be distinct from "how" would imply a non-deterministic (or non-physical, the universe may not be deterministic) agency which I don't think exists.
 
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