File me under those who don't agree with the article. They attempt to place the blame at the feet of RAM, which at the heart of the argument is really just a power difference. People are right to say that the GPU is just as important if not more so. But whichever you hang your hat on, you're still highlighting the power difference between the PS4 and XB1. But I don't think power alone is what hurt the Xbox 1. It was attempted death by a 1000 needles, with some needles being bigger than others.
The problem with trying find one culprit is that there aren't any real metrics to support any one claim. I submit that the problems that resulted in the Xbox 1's current position is from a collection of issues.
1. The Xbox 360's dominance last gen was not as deep-rooted as people perceived it to be. MS's dominance was in large part due to Sony's stumbles out the gate. The year lead in the marketplace with no competitor and the compounded issues of the PS3, helped make MS the de facto choice for games. These issues snowball. MS gets out earlier, people have one voice in the HD era, devs get their games out, and get better with their tools over time. Sony comes out a year later, but there's already a voice in the HD era to compare to. Devs are working on a more complex system, their games come out later and less mature than MS's. The year plus the discontinuation of the OG Xbox, gives MS a larger install base. More people with Xboxes activates the friend-effect. XBL is more mature out of the gate and by the time Sony launches, its had more time to mature as well. Public opinion is swayed by all of this. Having a bigger userbase gives MS the ability to get equal footing on franchises that were once relegated to Sony platforms. Releasing earlier and with less complex hardware allows MS to enjoy a price advantage as well. With 3rd parties there, it was safe to get an Xbox, you weren't missing out on GTA or FF or RE, franchises you knew from the 2 generations of PlayStation. And now that a person went there, you could discover more of MS's own exclusive offerings. There were graphical differences but largely the disparity was negligible for most. A userbase is a collective. People come for all kinds of reasons price, power, games, brand, and any combination of them.
The MS had a bigger seat at the table. They dominated in the US for sure and were viewed as the market leader (despite the Wii's sales). Being the leader grants you some benefits. You are now the standard that everything else is compared against. Competition is penalized for not having comparative offerings at the perceived scale. You also get more attention, so even though some of your own offerings may be inferior to your competitor, you have more visibility. Being the leader also gifts/burdens you with the responsibility of maintaining your status and providing a vision of the future for the industry. Up until last gen, MS had always been the challenger. Now it was viewed as the champ. Having all the attention and getting the perks of market leader can blur the lines of what's really kept you in power or what really matters to your audience. MS was getting praise for apps like Facebook, Twitter, Last FM, Netflix. That sends a message to them. While Sony was releasing more exclusives, MS was winning without as many. That sends a message. Kinect had more interest compared to Move, based largely off MS's mindshare than actual applications. That sends a message. Success can also falsely validate or exaggerate some measures that really didn't help you reach that success. The challenge becomes taking these messages and interpreting them correctly.
I submit that MS interpreted these messages incorrectly.
2. The XB1 was the 360, just not in public perception. Look at the media during last generation and reports will tell you that gamers watch more TV than play games. The yearly E3 breakdowns will show interest in apps coming to consoles in some cases presented in such a way that it overtakes gaming interest. Look at articles where people foresaw motion gaming in everything. The games that sold the most were still 3rd party games. The XB1 was in line to incorporate all of that. MS wouldn't lose out on any of those strengths. We all know the hardcore buy first. When Sony announced first, they set the tone. This was amidst all the speculation of DRM in both the new consoles. MS countered with a look into the TV-side of Xbox, in an effort to save their gaming portion for E3 just 2 or 3 weeks later. But its here that the damage to the brand began. The hardcore are paying attention at the start of a new gen...and eventually everyone pays attention. These consoles were launching in a new age of Twitter and Facebook. That is word of mouth. At this early stage, the brand is under the weight of DRM speculation and a perception that the system is all about TV. The negativity around DRM snowballs other issues. It cast a dark shadow on just about anything. When E3 rolls around, its fever pitch. Sony's not doing it, and MS is, while stumbling over the messaging. PR nightmare. We all remember the preorder numbers. Behind the scenes word of mouth is running wild. At this stage, everyone is paying attention and negativity is almost always louder than positivity. People were going to be analyzing the specs and all that anyway, but DRM puts a negative spin on everything. The NSA debacle, the always-on Kinect...a needle. The inevitable power debate that Xbox can't win...a needle. The eventual resolution debate...a needle. the price...a needle. Devs coming out in support of the competition...a needle. Policy debates..a needle. Inflammatory executive statements...a needle. There were many things to dissuade a consumer from Xbox.
3. Parity. A new generation has historically marked equal footing conceptually. you're not stuck by the hardware limitations of the last decade.You get a do-over to capitalize on what you learned. You get to chart out where you think the future is headed. Sony had a generation of watching their markeshare drop. When that happens you start re-evaluating things. Remember #1 from above. The PS3 was the PS2, just like the XB1 was the 360. Sony had success and assumed that creating complex hardware that afforded them any extra bit of power was preferable than developer ease. Developers would adapt as they had done in the past. And they would have if the PS3 was as dominant as PS2. But losing shined the light on that flawed logic. That hadn't been the sole key to their success as they had assumed. Neither was making a box that everything a gamer could want inside (which priced the box outside consumer's comforat level). They had folks hounding them about 360 features (cross game chat, apps, etc). They watched 3rd party IP migrate to the competition. They saw what a year lead can do. They also saw the benefits of community. And as they staged a comeback, they were forced to forge differentiators. NOTHING STAYS THE SAME. Sony focused on releasing earlier or at least simultaneously with MS. That's a big needle to MS. MS garnered some success in other countries, but they hadn't cemented themselves there. Their distribution had not matured greatly. Their content was still US-centric. The roots were even shallower there. Parity at release equated to parity at title offerings. Sony had a better price, and still had a legacy, and reputation of great first party offerings. None of the PR burden MS was experiencing allowed the console to shine. Sony's comeback started with the latter half of the PS3...it was comeback of near equal marketshare and brand awareness/mindshare. MS was already positioned to lose WW at the start of this generation anyway, provided Sony showed up decently at launch. The expectation was that they would retain at least 70% of their US marketshare lead. Parity with Sony is a loss for MS.
Ultimately, MS largely stuck to the same game plan, and didn't really learn some crucial lessons while in the leadership role. They assumed gamers knew they'd get the same experience on the 360 roughly, but failed to realize that you have to re-make the case every gen. Their strides to strengthen and broaden their mindshare in other countries was insufficient.They lost out on the benefits that a year lead can grant you. Consequently, fell to a competitor that had improved from the last go-round, and still maintains a lot of its core strengths. Just like Sony, the fall from grace will make them re-evaluate their strategy if they want to stay in this industry. its early days, but we will see how they adapt as the years go on.
