I appreciate the reply (should have guessed one would be coming).
Furcas said:
But Christianity is supposed to help its followers be better people than they would be otherwise. Dawkins didn't say that we should expect crime to be non-existent in places where Christians represent the near totality of the population, just lower. If believing in the alleged Source of All Morality and attempting to follow His commandments doesn't help in the slightest (and even makes things worse!), what's the point?
I'm not sure that 'helping its followers to be better people' is a fair reflection of the aim of Christianity. It is more complicated than that. This is the assumption that Dawkins makes, and it is exactly the sort of rash generalisation that he takes issue with when Christians apply them to evolution.
There's a difference between salvation and avoidance of criminal behavior, in the same way there's a difference between evolution and macromutation.
So, yes, it's a mistake - and it is the sort of mistake that Dawkins particularly (and justifiably) dislikes.
So? Whatever effect this has on the statistics about crime in areas with a high percentage of Christians, it has the same effect on areas with a lower percentage of Christians.
Not necessarily - because we don't have enough information, there are too many other possible variables, and we're talking about small numbers in large populations (especially when he gets on to looking at voting patterns, which puts an extra level of indirection into the argument). The effect, if there is one and whatever direction it goes, is not statistically significant. Again this is something that Dawkins dislikes when other people pull it on him, and he shouldn't do it himself.
Ugh.
First, it absolutely does not follow that because selfish exploiters are likely to appear in a big enough population of selfless cooperators, therefore the more selfless the cooperators are, the greater the number of selfish exploiters will be. The number of selfish exploiters is a function of the stupidity and naiveté of the cooperators, not of their selflessness.
Second, this point you're talking about is a point about the evolution of animal behavior. Humans are animals, but we're very strange animals. One of the things that make us strange is that our behavior can be changed radically by the ideas we pick up during our lives, whereas other animals are much more likely to stick to what their genes have programmed them to be. In other words, memetics adds a whole new layer of complexity to human behavior, a complexity that is way, way above the reach of basic calculations about the survival likelihood of genes. What you're doing is like trying to apply the kind of reasoning that worked well for chess to actual warfare.
Your first point is true, even on a simplified model, only if comparing different populations both populated by selfless co-operators. But Dawkins seems to be saying is that a Christian population should contain a much higher proportion of selfless cooperators. That
would leave it more open to attack. And, by the way, if you are a selfless co-operator I can't see that degrees of intelligence/naivety have any further impact.
Of course, in real populations it is far more complicated than this - but again we see Dawkins making what looks like an unwarranted generalisation, but here it is worse, as he is making it on the naive grounds that he himself has (justifiably) attacked in other books.
Your second point really doesn't help at all, because the reasoning around competitive and stable strategies is broadly applicable to
all[/] competitive populations - whether animal or human, digital, economic etc. It is not limited to situations where there is a selection pressure on genetic material, and so not restricted to genes v memes at all. And while the behaviour patterns may be complex, the principles still hold, and Dawkins should not have ignored them - they are very relevant to his argument and slap bang in the middle of what he specialises in.
I really don't understand why Dawkins let himself get carried away by the rhetoric in this instance. As I said, this is very rare for him. Sure, it is a persuasive argument, but I have no truck with an argument that is false, no matter how persuasive it is. That, I think, is a sentiment that Dawkins would heartily support.