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Merkel open to have a shared Eurozone Budget

cartesian

Member
Perhaps it could be done in self interest by the Germans.
Maybe. It might stabilise the Euro. But it won't solve the economic problems of southern Europe, and the Euro will ultimately still be a drag on parts of the continent.


  • Fiscal union is improbable: the scale of the transfers is so large, and the number of countries in the Eurozone so great, that it's extremely hard to imagine the extent and depth of political agreement needed to implement this policy being achieved. If France and Germany are absolutely agreed at both electorate and government levels then it does become more likely, but the agreement of the Netherlands and Finland, among others, is still hard to envisage. The likelihood of an agreement increases if you substantially water down the depth of the fiscal union and the depth of fiscal transfers required - the EU muddled compromise - but doing so also would also reduce the effectiveness of the policy.
  • Fiscal union is unsustainable: for it to be effective, very large scale fiscal transfers will be needed on an indefinite basis, and it's very unlikely that the net contributor states will be able to maintain unanimous and unyielding political commitment to subsidising 'profligate' nations indefinitely. If populist parties manage to take even just a single contributor-state out of the union, the subsidy burden becomes much greater on the others, accelerating break-down in the union.
  • Fiscal union is ineffective: it may stabilise the Eurozone in the near-term but it will not address the underlying structural and competitiveness problems in the troubled economies. It will also not give these countries the monetary or fiscal freedom to facilitate solutions. It may even reduce the pressure on these countries to solve their economic problems, eventually generating resentment within contributor-states electorates.
The last point is probably the most crucial. Even if the Eurozone could somehow overcome the seemingly implacable-opposition of sceptical member-states, even if we could somehow bind all successive governments to continue paying transfers in perpetuity with no possibility of withdrawing (and thus pulling the rug out)... I still don't think it would solve the problems that have caused life in these countries to get harder. And the European Union must be about more than simple ensuring its own stability. If it doesn't make life easier, what is the point in stabilising it?

Fiscal union will not fix the underlying structural problems in the Greek, Italian, and Spanish (etc.) economies. Many of the problems debilitating these economies predate the introduction of the Euro and remain unsolved partly because these states are unwilling to identify/accept/address their problems. But the Euro also makes these problems much more acute, and simultaneously much difficult to tackle, because the Eurozone framework imposes a kind of straitjacket on these economies and makes them less flexible and in the long-run less competitive.

Stabilising the Eurozone via fiscal union simply means northern member-states subsidising paralysed economies on an indefinite basis. It means the problems of the struggling countries are less likely bring down the prosperous countries. But it won't make life much easier in the struggling countries. It's a stability measure - one that comes with a phenomenal price tag - but not a real solution to the fact that Economic and Monetary Union in itself inherently makes life in 'outlying' (economically, not geographically) economies significantly harder.

Fiscal union will not address the underlying issues so why should the northern states pour so much money into a system that will fail to meet the desired output specification? That is - stability and growth, not merely stability alone.

You risk ending up advocating a policy literally because it enables us to keep going with a policy that evidently doesn't work - but which we put up with because, bluntly, it's not progressive to admit that it doesn't work, and the suggestion that it might never work is politically toxic and unthinkable. But what if that's true?

We're desperately trying to find a form of integration that preserves the form of integration we already have. The big idea in European policy-making is literally integration at all costs. But the challenges of the modern world are so complex that it seems implausible to me that can really be the solution to every problem. Conservatives shouldn't be able to occupy the space of rational criticism of European policy-making - the EU does have flaws and some of its policies may be inadequate. Progressives should be able to say - look, I like Europe and I want to preserve a European Union and preserve European cooperation, but I don't think the Eurozone is stable and that instability and contagion risks jeopardising the European Union as a whole.

If you want to prevent populists tearing the union apart, I think we need to look at ideas other than 'keep what we have and add more integration'. That may mean slowly phasing-out the Euro - in other words, less integration, less federalism. Or it may mean taking a page from our Roman ancestors and loosening the one-size-only straitjacket by subdividing the European economic policy framework into a 'Northern European Union' and a 'Southern European Union', or somesuch arrangement; if we can't have a single currency, maybe two or three currencies would be stable and at least be better than going back to a more than a dozen. Or perhaps it may mean a new single currency with a smaller and more sustainable membership able to maintain the federal cohesion you seek. Or it might mean something else entirely.

To give a very simplistic analogy, fiscal union means agreeing to share a bank account with a bunch of people, some of whom you trust implicitly, but some of whom struggle to manage their money. It may not entirely be their fault. They may be lovely people who mean well. And sharing your bank account with them seems well-intentioned in a spirit of family and solidarity. But it will not solve the problem and it will not work. Both sides will become distrustful and feel like the other doesn't understand or isn't listening. Instability and discord is the end result. I don't mean, by this analogy, to imply any kind of cultural superiority over Greece etc - lord knows my own country's problems are the world's gossip these days - or that individual southern Europeans are financially untrustworthy. I simply mean to draw attention to the fact that some of these governments (not common citizens) have poor track records in this area and the progressive drive for happy solidarity is perhaps a bit naive and risky.

The quotes below are from very Eurosceptic sources (The Telegraph and Forbes) with whom I share little in common, and whose arguments don't necessarily fully support or match my own, but I wanted to include them because I find them interesting and because the help illustrate the issues I am talking about. These may be right-wing sources but what they say seems reasonable and evidence based, more so at least than the progressive vision of ever closer union. Please at least consider what they are saying even if you share my disdain for conservative outlets. Personally, I am a progressive and a former European federalist. But I am also a pragmatist, and if it seems to me that a conservative is talking sense, I think we should at least hear them out and use the opportunity to self-reflect on the evidence and realism of what we believe.

Forbes article said:
In order for the automatic stabilisers of such fiscal policy to be of any use they've got to amount to 2 and 3% of local GDP. That means that the total amount flowing through that central Treasury has to be of the order of 20% of GDP, as is the case in the US (or even better, the 40% flowing through London in the UK system). And there is simply no way that the countries of the eurozone are going to do this. It simply will not happen. Germany isn't going to send 20% of GP to Brussels for Brussels then to apportion it would across the eurozone. Nor is Finland, or Italy, or Spain. You might just about be able to persuade somewhere like Greece that it's a good idea, given that they will get much more out of the pot than they put in. But the large and richer nations simply are not going to do this.

Macron's right in his economic analysis, fiscal union is necessary to save the euro. But it simply will never happen at the required scale. Germany simply will not agree to pay Greek pensions directly and forever. Thus the plan will fail.

Telegraph article said:
"[Fiscal union] is not a panacea", Mr Blanchard told The Telegraph. "It should be done, but we should not think once it is done, the euro will work perfectly, and things will be forever fine."

[...]

Any mechanism to transfer funds from strong to weak nations - which has been fiercely resisted by Germany - would only mask the fundamental competitiveness problems that will always plague struggling member states, he said.

Although pooling common funds, giving Brussels tax and spending powers, and creating a banking union were "essential" reforms, they would still not make the "euro function smoothly even in the best of cases", said the Frenchman.

"Fiscal transfers will help you go through the tough spot, but at the same time, it will decrease the urge to do the required competitiveness adjustment."

[...]

Without the power to devalue their currencies, peripheral economies would forever be forced to endure "tough adjustment", such as slashing their wages, to keep up with stronger member states, he said.

[...]

"I can see how some people are very fed up with Brussels, but that would be a very superficial reaction to just leave Europe because there are technocrats that you don't like."

For all his misgivings about the single currency, Mr Blanchard said the EU as a whole remained a "fundamentally good construction".
 
It's not a real EU thread without Madness' obligatory "UK set to overtake Germany's economy by XXX"*-post

*based on wildly outdated numbers and projections, continuing EU migration and access to the common market
 

Xando

Member
So Merkel and Macron are currently meeting in Berlin

Some interesting qoutes:

Merkel announces France and Germany will develop a "roadmap" of joint projects.
Macron's talking now. Stresses (as on his previous visits to Berlin) that more mutual trust essential for closer relationship.
Macron calls for: "a less bureaucratic Europe, a Europe that protects people". Bit "tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime", that.
Macron: "we are in a time of refoundation [in Europe]... each must play his part"
Merkel & Macron asked about cheering crowds outside. EM talks of reviving European spirit: "without Europe no peace, prosperity, freedom".
Merkel asked about treaty changes: "from German perspective it's possible to change the treaties.... Germany ready for that." Well now.
https://twitter.com/JeremyCliffe/status/864170801809035264
Merkel being open to treaty changes is pretty big.

Somewhere right now Schäuble is furious
 

Xando

Member
Turns out it only took Macron and Merkel being ahead of what might be her last term to at least move towards the framework of progress. Maybe 2 years too late though.

It's interesting since i've read a article yesterday that Macron already negotiated back in 2012(when he was a advisor to hollande) to have a euro finance minister and budget.It was agreed upon with the german goverment until the commission asked for a 150bn budget and they dropped the idea and went with the ESM.

The idea came back up in 2013 but Hollande wanted to wait until 2019 when he's reelected (funny how that worked) and Macron now continues to pursue the idea and seems to have a overall agreement with Merkel (details obviously will be tricky).

Article is in german but you can read it up here:
http://de.reuters.com/article/frankreich-deutschland-idDEKCN18A0LP
 

RoyalFool

Banned
It's worth noting that Germany has a very lopsided export/import ratio, which also benefits (a lot) from the weak eurozone countries. Usually strong exports vs weak imports would crank up your own inflation and currency strength, but they've managed to avoid this by basically fucking over Greece.

Not sure why everybody thinks Germany is some savior of Europe when it's taking advantage of half of it.
 

Theonik

Member
It's worth noting that Germany has a very lopsided export/import ratio, which also benefits (a lot) from the weak eurozone countries. Usually strong exports vs weak imports would crank up your own inflation and currency strength, but they've managed to avoid this by basically fucking over Greece.

Not sure why everybody thinks Germany is some savior of Europe when it's taking advantage of half of it.
German firms also largely benefited from the bubbles in southern states since the high supply of inexpensive lending lead to an increase of consumption of goods in those countries many of which were imported.
 

PrinceMunich

Neo Member
Shared Eurozone Budget = Germany has to pay everyone's bills.

The whole concept of the EU nowadays is just wrong. It was never meant to be this way.
What started as a monetary union is now Germany as a paymaster for countries which should never habe been part of this community.

This will only help to strengthen radical parties in all of Europe.
 

PrinceMunich

Neo Member
It's a thin line. Merkel's competitor is a big fan of eurobonds. Fortunately his party got a big kick in the nuts yesterday when people voted in Nordrhein Westfalen.

Nevertheless, I'm not a big fan of Merkel but she's the lesser evil.
 
Eurobonds are actually the better proposal and the logical end game but I'm playing the long game.

Actually they aren't. Atleast not from the German perspective. There is no such thing as "Germany Bonds" for German states, so why should there be Eurobonds for Eurozone countries?


RoyalFool said:
It's worth noting that Germany has a very lopsided export/import ratio, which also benefits (a lot) from the weak eurozone countries. Usually strong exports vs weak imports would crank up your own inflation and currency strength, but they've managed to avoid this by basically fucking over Greece.

Not sure why everybody thinks Germany is some savior of Europe when it's taking advantage of half of it.

Greece has nothing to do with the weak Euro, it's like 2% of the Eurozones GDP.

It should also be noted that Germany had a large export-surplus before the Euro depreciated. Plus Germany actually wants a strong Euro, while most of the southern countries want it weak.
 

Theonik

Member
Actually they aren't. Atleast not from the German perspective. There is no such thing as "Germany Bonds" for German states, so why should there be Eurobonds for Eurozone countries?
Of course they do.


Greece has nothing to do with the weak Euro, it's like 2% of the Eurozones GDP.

It should also be noted that Germany had a large export-surplus before the Euro depreciated. Plus Germany actually wants a strong Euro, while most of the southern countries want it weak.
Political will is fickle, what is now politically toxic in Germany won't always be so.
One simply needs wait for when the pendulum next swings. But even so.
 

Theonik

Member
No, they don't. German states borrow Money on their own, with vastly different interest rates, too.
The bundesbank can and does issue bonds for the German federation. The idea of Eurobonds is to divest similar powers to the ECB, allowing the total debt in the Eurozone to be contained. There are many ways to implement such a proposal. I don't think any state wants to give EZ countries a carte Blanche to borrow more money which is why part of proposals is to only allow this for borrowing up to 60% to GDP in Eurobonds where upon additional debt falls on states. (with default on any of the debt amounting on a default on the total debt)

The opposition to this is largely political in nature and more importantly an issue of optics. In the first place, the bailouts which were not necessarily much different in principle. It's the strings attached to them that caused most of the aftermath.

What makes this inevitable is that the end goal of a monetary union must be a fiscal union, so this is the first step of a fiscal union. But since the EZ was established there has been no way of stopping this train.
 
The bundesbank can and does issue bonds for the German federation. The idea of Eurobonds is to divest similar powers to the ECB, allowing the total debt in the Eurozone to be contained. There are many ways to implement such a proposal. I don't think any state wants to give EZ countries a carte Blanche to borrow more money which is why part of proposals is to only allow this for borrowing up to 60% to GDP in Eurobonds where upon additional debt falls on states. (with default on any of the debt amounting on a default on the total debt)

The opposition to this is largely political in nature and more importantly an issue of optics. In the first place, the bailouts which were not necessarily much different in principle. It's the strings attached to them that caused most of the aftermath.

What makes this inevitable is that the end goal of a monetary union must be a fiscal union, so this is the first step of a fiscal union. But since the EZ was established there has been no way of stopping this train.

Please read my post again. German STATES don't have access to "Germany bonds".

I.e. from the German perspective, it doesn't make sense Eurozone states would have access to Eurobonds. A potential Eurozone-budget of course would.
 
They basically have 4 years to start proper reform of the EU before we're hit with another wave of right-wing populism, so it's good to see that Germany is stepping up to France's propositions.
 

Theonik

Member
Please read my post again. German STATES don't have access to "Germany bonds".

I.e. from the German perspective, it doesn't make sense Eurozone states would have access to Eurobonds. A potential Eurozone-budget of course would.
Yes. But the solutions are not mutually exclusive. They are two parts of a fiscal union and creating these mechanisms in tandem will be essential for the long-term future. The bailouts were disastrous. Creating systems that can solve these problems without political holdups is essential to make them not happen.
 
Yes. But the solutions are not mutually exclusive. They are two parts of a fiscal union and creating these mechanisms in tandem will be essential for the long-term future. The bailouts were disastrous. Creating systems that can solve these problems without political holdups is essential to make them not happen.

What exactly are these solutions you are talking about?
 
Shared Eurozone Budget = Germany has to pay everyone's bills.

The whole concept of the EU nowadays is just wrong. It was never meant to be this way.
What started as a monetary union is now Germany as a paymaster for countries which should never habe been part of this community.

This will only help to strengthen radical parties in all of Europe.
Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, France, Austria, Finland, Sweden and even Italy are net contributors though. It's not just Germany, but their share is the largest since they 1) are simply the largest country 2) have the largest economy and 3) profit the most from the euro.
 
I think this is good. This would have been very difficult to implement with the UK still being in the EU, albeit not in the Eurozone but it makes sense for the Eurozone countries I guess. There is no way in hell the UK would have been a party to this though so perhaps this is a positive for brexit.
 
Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, France, Austria, Finland, Sweden and even Italy are net contributors though. It's not just Germany, but their share is the largest since they 1) are simply the largest country 2) have the largest economy and 3) profit the most from the euro.

for info

5867be926c9b191a008b4c8f-1035
 
One more step towards a federal Europe. Fuck yes.

If the Union survives throughout Brexit with no further casualties, which I'm confident it will, I think Brexit will have been a blessing as a lot more can get done in making Europe a more efficient and integrated federation.
Yes, it is win-win. Most people in the UK could never get behind a federal Europe, hence the constant veto-ing of EU decision by UK in the last twenty years.

No matter what anyone says - a strong EU is good for the world and, as our neighbour, good for Britain too.
 

bosseye

Member
Maybe. It might stabilise the Euro. But it won't solve the economic problems of southern Europe, and the Euro will ultimately still be a drag on parts of the continent.


  • Fiscal union is improbable: the scale of the transfers is so large, and the number of countries in the Eurozone so great, that it's extremely hard to imagine the extent and depth of political agreement needed to implement this policy being achieved. If France and Germany are absolutely agreed at both electorate and government levels then it does become more likely, but the agreement of the Netherlands and Finland, among others, is still hard to envisage. The likelihood of an agreement increases if you substantially water down the depth of the fiscal union and the depth of fiscal transfers required - the EU muddled compromise - but doing so also would also reduce the effectiveness of the policy.
  • Fiscal union is unsustainable: for it to be effective, very large scale fiscal transfers will be needed on an indefinite basis, and it's very unlikely that the net contributor states will be able to maintain unanimous and unyielding political commitment to subsidising 'profligate' nations indefinitely. If populist parties manage to take even just a single contributor-state out of the union, the subsidy burden becomes much greater on the others, accelerating break-down in the union.
  • Fiscal union is ineffective: it may stabilise the Eurozone in the near-term but it will not address the underlying structural and competitiveness problems in the troubled economies. It will also not give these countries the monetary or fiscal freedom to facilitate solutions. It may even reduce the pressure on these countries to solve their economic problems, eventually generating resentment within contributor-states electorates.
The last point is probably the most crucial. Even if the Eurozone could somehow overcome the seemingly implacable-opposition of sceptical member-states, even if we could somehow bind all successive governments to continue paying transfers in perpetuity with no possibility of withdrawing (and thus pulling the rug out)... I still don't think it would solve the problems that have caused life in these countries to get harder. And the European Union must be about more than simple ensuring its own stability. If it doesn't make life easier, what is the point in stabilising it?

Fiscal union will not fix the underlying structural problems in the Greek, Italian, and Spanish (etc.) economies. Many of the problems debilitating these economies predate the introduction of the Euro and remain unsolved partly because these states are unwilling to identify/accept/address their problems. But the Euro also makes these problems much more acute, and simultaneously much difficult to tackle, because the Eurozone framework imposes a kind of straitjacket on these economies and makes them less flexible and in the long-run less competitive.

Stabilising the Eurozone via fiscal union simply means northern member-states subsidising paralysed economies on an indefinite basis. It means the problems of the struggling countries are less likely bring down the prosperous countries. But it won't make life much easier in the struggling countries. It's a stability measure - one that comes with a phenomenal price tag - but not a real solution to the fact that Economic and Monetary Union in itself inherently makes life in 'outlying' (economically, not geographically) economies significantly harder.

Fiscal union will not address the underlying issues so why should the northern states pour so much money into a system that will fail to meet the desired output specification? That is - stability and growth, not merely stability alone.

You risk ending up advocating a policy literally because it enables us to keep going with a policy that evidently doesn't work - but which we put up with because, bluntly, it's not progressive to admit that it doesn't work, and the suggestion that it might never work is politically toxic and unthinkable. But what if that's true?

We're desperately trying to find a form of integration that preserves the form of integration we already have. The big idea in European policy-making is literally integration at all costs. But the challenges of the modern world are so complex that it seems implausible to me that can really be the solution to every problem. Conservatives shouldn't be able to occupy the space of rational criticism of European policy-making - the EU does have flaws and some of its policies may be inadequate. Progressives should be able to say - look, I like Europe and I want to preserve a European Union and preserve European cooperation, but I don't think the Eurozone is stable and that instability and contagion risks jeopardising the European Union as a whole.

If you want to prevent populists tearing the union apart, I think we need to look at ideas other than 'keep what we have and add more integration'. That may mean slowly phasing-out the Euro - in other words, less integration, less federalism. Or it may mean taking a page from our Roman ancestors and loosening the one-size-only straitjacket by subdividing the European economic policy framework into a 'Northern European Union' and a 'Southern European Union', or somesuch arrangement; if we can't have a single currency, maybe two or three currencies would be stable and at least be better than going back to a more than a dozen. Or perhaps it may mean a new single currency with a smaller and more sustainable membership able to maintain the federal cohesion you seek. Or it might mean something else entirely.

To give a very simplistic analogy, fiscal union means agreeing to share a bank account with a bunch of people, some of whom you trust implicitly, but some of whom struggle to manage their money. It may not entirely be their fault. They may be lovely people who mean well. And sharing your bank account with them seems well-intentioned in a spirit of family and solidarity. But it will not solve the problem and it will not work. Both sides will become distrustful and feel like the other doesn't understand or isn't listening. Instability and discord is the end result. I don't mean, by this analogy, to imply any kind of cultural superiority over Greece etc - lord knows my own country's problems are the world's gossip these days - or that individual southern Europeans are financially untrustworthy. I simply mean to draw attention to the fact that some of these governments (not common citizens) have poor track records in this area and the progressive drive for happy solidarity is perhaps a bit naive and risky.

The quotes below are from very Eurosceptic sources (The Telegraph and Forbes) with whom I share little in common, and whose arguments don't necessarily fully support or match my own, but I wanted to include them because I find them interesting and because the help illustrate the issues I am talking about. These may be right-wing sources but what they say seems reasonable and evidence based, more so at least than the progressive vision of ever closer union. Please at least consider what they are saying even if you share my disdain for conservative outlets. Personally, I am a progressive and a former European federalist. But I am also a pragmatist, and if it seems to me that a conservative is talking sense, I think we should at least hear them out and use the opportunity to self-reflect on the evidence and realism of what we believe.

Very well said.
 
D

Deleted member 231381

Unconfirmed Member
What's up with Belgium and Luxembourg?

Lots of European institutions are housed there, so EU spending on those countries is correspondingly quite high. It's why everyone is so keen to win the EMA off the UK, for example.
 
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