Shortly thereafter, yet another delegation from Japan paid its respects at Sega of America headquarders. Paid its respects is probably not the correct term; arrived to give Nakayama's latest marching orders was probably more like it. The 32X debacle had caused Kalinske's Japanese masters to begin reasserting control of what they considered to be their errant American underlings. Sega of Japan was concerned about the growing PlayStation hype. Sony was rumored to be planning a massively expensive pre-launch marketing campaign to make sure that the PlayStation got plenty of media exposure for its upcoming launch that fall. Nakayama was taking no chances - he was convinced that Sega needed to strike the first blow and hopefully knock Sony out of the running before PlayStation could get up a full head of steam. Why? Sony had deep pockets; Sega didn't. Sony could easily outspend Sega in a marketing war; therefore, Sega would have to beat them on product alone. With this in mind, Nakayama ordered Sega of America to accellerate the U.S. launch of the Saturn and bring it to market at the first available opportunity. The price of the Saturn in the U.S. would remain unchanged - about US$400 or so. Kalinske vehemently objected, as did practically everybody at Sega of America. All of them, in one form or another, were trying to tell Nakayama the same thing: "It's too early to launch the Saturn in America. The price is too high, and we have practically no software for it." Both Nakayama and the rest of Sega's corporate board of directors refused to listen, for Sega of Japan was by now calling the shots. The future of Sega was at stake and the odds were long. Since Sega could never conceivably outspend Sony, they had to find a way to outsell them. Such a move required a daring stroke, one that would gain instant market attention. An early launch of the Saturn in the U.S. would do just that; futhermore, it would give the console valuable lead time in this new market that was still anybody's for the taking. Saturn had proven itself in Japan against PlayStation, it seemed, so there was no reason not to expect the same in America. Sega of Japan did not want Saturn to suffer the same fate as the 32X - a fiasco for which some personally blamed Kalinske. The pleas of Sega of America was overruled by Nakayama, and from that point forward Kalinske and his staff would have practically no say in managing the affairs of Sega's U.S. market interests.