I'll be entirely honest with you at the risk of undermining myself in this thread. My background is not in philosophy of science. I mostly read and research in public policy. I am currently reading Bruno Latour's
Politics of Nature (VERY. SLOWLY.) but I find the subject very difficult so I only dabble. One of my close friends is doing his PhD in Historical/Philosophy of Science and I have a very hard time keeping up with him. I'll take the book recommendation under advisement though, as I haven't read it! (As it relates to philosophy of science-ish and your username,
Godel Escher Bach is probably one of my favourite books of all time because it hews a little closer to my interest in computation while keeping a sort of quasi-philosophical perspective.)
Thanks for keeping me on my toes.
Don't worry about not having a background in philosophy of science, you seem very conversant anyway. I've not read a lot of Latour myself, I should get around to it.
BTW, 'Gödel's metric' is a solution to Einstein's field equations in which the universe rotates and you can travel through time. I can't remember whether he mentions it in GEB at all. But the story behind it is pretty cool. Basically Einstein and Gödel were very good friends in Princeton, and they had a bet between them about a particular, lets say philosophical, aspect of Einstein's theory of General Relativity. Gödel produced his solution in order to prove a point to Einstein, and presented the solution to him for his birthday.
Numbering done not to be dickish but because I'm too lazy to cut and paste quotes
1. To me it seems like you've never done scientific research or been a member of a lab. It's important because having a scientific background increases the likelihood that you understand what the discipline is all about. There's a difference between learning about something from an academic perspective, and experiencing it first hand. Good luck with your schooling, but Philosophy of Science isn't science, it's philosophy. Ultimately it will probably require you to make normative statements. Normative statements are ultimately unscientific (which is why Conservationism isn't really a science). It's like the difference between fighting a war in Iraq and playing a lot of Call of Duty (altough less extreme).
2. A scientist is a practitioner of science. Science is the scientific method: systematic observation, measurement, and experiment, and the formulation, testing, and modification of hypotheses. If a hypothesis cannot be falsified it is not science. "Is there life on other planets?" is not technically a scientific question because we cannot yet test it. All Popper did was say that hypothesis testing was ultimately deductive instead of inductive. But so what? As a scientist I find that distinction unnecessary. That's a philosophical question. As a scientist the only thing I care about is whether I can say that the probability of event X happening is unlikely to be the result of chance alone. I don't care if that logic is more accurately described as deductive or inductive. Science is the result the statement, not that background reasoning.
Also, because in my experience with philosophers they continually ignore the scientific method. If something doesn't follow the scientific method it's not science. Science is no more than observation and reporting those observations.
3. Did Galileo makes falsifiable hypotheses and test them? If not he's not a scientist (this is why mathematicians are not considered scientists). Making observations about the natural world doesn't make you a scientist. For the same reason Darwin is not a proper scientist. Darwin was a naturalist, he saw things in nature, made inferences about them, and formed hypotheses. But he never tested those hypotheses. Thus, Darwin didn't come up with the "Theory of Evolution". He came up with the hypothesis of evolution, that biologists have developed into a theory over the last 150 years. All of those people are more accurately described as forerunners of science.
Predictive hypotheses do not make you a scientist. Falsifiable hypotheses that are actually tested do. Prediction is just a sign that the hypothesis is broad in its application. But it is not necessary. Again, the things that are necessary are: falsifiability and testing.
4. Those things are all great. I enjoy questions of philosophy of science. It's an interesting field. But none of those things are science. They are also unnecessary when educating students about science. In a basic biology course there is already more than enough necessary information to teach. Philosophy of Science would make a great course, maybe it should be required for majors, but there isn't room for it in basic curricula. For a basic course for non-majors nearly the first half of biology is dedicated to explaining basic chemistry and physics. The next quarter evolution, and the last quarter ecology, physiology and cell biology. The entire time I have to continually reinforce the scientific method. It would be fun to have philosophical aspects, but because they are unnecessary they have to go.
5. I'm not pigeonholing it. I'm saying science is not philosophy, as science is not theology. They are different, and it is inappropriate, confusing, misleading and unnecessary to mix them. The nuance of whether or not a virus is "alive" is mostly unimportant from a scientific point of view. What is important is what that virus is made out of, what types of genes it has, and how is it able to replicate. I don't need philosophy to help me answer those questions.
Don't worry about numbering, it definitely helps clarify stuff.
1. Perhaps I have been unclear on this point: I don't consider myself a scientist, and I don't consider the stuff done in philosophy of science lectures to be science. I do, however, conceive of certain parts of philosophy as continuous with science, and thus capable of informing science, and vice versa. And for what it's worth, I don't think that philosophers should be offering normative advice to scientists. It seems to me that enterprise is almost always a bad idea.
2. Again, you are packaging a particular
philosophical conception of science and selling it as
The Scientific Method. With one hand you are pushing forward the view that you don't believe philosophy of science has any bearing on you as a scientist, and on the other you are pushing a philosophical conception of science and declaring it to be 'non philosophical'.
3. And this is precisely what I mean -- falsifiability was not a concern of scientists until after Popper wrote about it. You are presenting it as some kind of philosophy-neutral description of scientific process, when in fact it's just a repackaged conception of science attributable to a philosopher. A view that has become particularly prevalent self-image among scientists themselves, but still not an actual description of the way science has been done and continues to be done. And if you think 'well I work in a lab so I know what it's like and it's definitely like I say it is'--it might be somewhat like that
for you. For every 10,000 biologists sitting in a lab running repeats of experiments to gather data, there's an Einstein tucked away in a study somewhere uncovering insights about spacetime without running a single experiment, and science accomodates both.
For example, before falsificationism was popular, there was a view of science, called conventionalism, that asserted that particular hypotheses were in fact not tested at all in science, because they were conventions selected by scientists and not properly speaking empirical hypotheses. This was a philosophical conception put forward by a scientist, Henri Poincaré. Poincaré would have denied that the spirit of science is putting forward empirical hypotheses capable of falsification (as would, I suspect, most scientists prior to the 1930s).
Moreover, scientists have not historically been that great at judging what they do. Newton, for example, claimed he arrived at his mechanics by a process of induction from Kepler's laws. It didn't take very long for his contemporaries to point out that such a feat is impossible.
As for dismissing Galileo, Newton, Darwin etc. as not being scientists: at least you're consistent!
4. Again, see point 1. Sorry if I've made it seem as though I believe these to be core scientific questions and the kind of thing that should be taught in physics 101. These are philosophical questions that are continuous with science.
5. You insist you're not pigeonholing and then proceed to pigeonhole. I'm not very much interested myself in whether viruses are alive either.