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737Max: Boy sitting in row 26 had his t-shirt sucked off him while his mother was holding on to him - Alaska Airlines flight B39M

Tams

Member
Man, the fuck is going on with quality control at Boeing?

Subcontracted out to lower costs and to avoid unions, done by business people in management.

Boeings were good (well, aforementioned DC-10s aside) back when Boeing did most of it in-house. They had actual engineers as management back then.

The 777 was the last airliner they designed and built before the change, and you can tell.
 

sono

Gold Member
The NTSB have found the door. It ended up in a school teachers back yard in Portland

 

Tams

Member
The NTSB have found the door. It ended up in a school teachers back yard in Portland



ice hockey GIF by NHL
 

Happosai

Hold onto your panties

Alaska Airlines plane had warnings days before mid-air blowout​

This was released last April and I've read additional detail that the fitting should be of great concern. Yet, they shrugged THIS ONE off.

A supplier used a “non-standard manufacturing process” during the installation of two fittings in the rear fuselage, Boeing said in a statement to CNN.

Read somewhere in an aviation discussion that this was a stabilizer screw and fitting which was the mechanical issue with the 737Max.

This should be more troubling that the issue which happened with a dummy door collapsing from compression. Alaska Airlines Flight 261 is a grim reminder of how such a small mechanical piece (s) failure can lead to catastrophe.

TL;DR...stay off the 737Max. I've never had a fear of commercial aircraft and have been following aviation for nearly 20-years. No modern plane gives me the chills like this one.
 

RagnarokIV

Member
They better give out compensation for the phones. I'd be fucken pissed if mine got sucked out and damaged/lost.
 

IntentionalPun

Ask me about my wife's perfect butthole
NGL if that was my phone I'd be a bit mad it didn't autolock. What if I was browsing something.....sensitive in the privacy of my 16,000 foot high cabin and drop my phone???
Lessen learned that’s their settings fault not the phones.

Can’t believe people don’t put passwords on their phones lol
 

Happosai

Hold onto your panties
They better give out compensation for the phones. I'd be fucken pissed if mine got sucked out and damaged/lost.
Yes and no. Yes for those whose phones were unrecovered. No for the person with the recovered and working iPhone. iPhone did a few marketing ads on an 'unbreakable' iPhone a couple years back. Well...this one dropped 16,000 after being jettisoned from a plane on ascent. I don't think many manufacturers can boast that. Creative money there if they pitch that to Apple or sell the story to a large news outlet.
 
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Managing Director in the financial world... there is more than one path to get MD lol.

But as others have said, Boeing has been about financial engineering and shareholder returns for the past decade rather than actual mechanical/electrical/aerospace engineering. The doc did a good job explaining when that transition took place. Boeing planes haven't been quality in a long time.

Edit: LMAO in this case it was indeed McDondell Douglas. Regardless, Boeing is run by a much of financial MDs, not engineers.
 
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JayK47

Member
The airlines are such a mess right now. You can't really trust the planes, the pilots, or the traffic controllers. The bar has been lowered and we will be paying for it with stuff like this. These people on the plane were lucky it was not way worse. Sure the crap out of everyone involved.
 

Seattle Times usually has good coverage of Boeing for people who want to follow along. It's sad to see what has happened to what was one of the best companies on Earth. These days, I only want to fly on Airbus planes. You don't know if you can trust an airliner made by Boeing today and that's a long fall from the last century when you wanted to fly Boeing and nothing else.
 
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natjjohn

Member
I've started looking at what plane is attached to which flight in recent years. I prefer flights with Airbus planes if possible, but at the very least I avoid any flights on 737 MAX planes.

Unfortunately my preferred airline when flying domestically has long been Southwest and that will no longer be possible in a few years as Southwest has committed to replacing their entire fleet with 737 MAX sometime in the future.

That’s a bummer. Fly southwest typically and want no part of this plane
 

Thaedolus

Gold Member
The crashes that occurred years ago appeared to be from a mistake in risk analysis leading to a design and training flaw…tragic mistake, but once you go back and reexamine everything for two years, should be good to go on that front.

Ongoing QC issues though…far more concerning. First that the supplier is making so many mistakes and second that Boeing wasn’t catching them and implementing immediate corrective actions
 

jufonuk

not tag worthy

Bolts in need of "additional tightening" have been found during inspections of Boeing 737 Max 9s, United Airlines has said.

That’s fucking insane. Just that caused this. Someone couldn’t be assed to do their job correctly and now this.
So luckily not a design flaw just incompetence which can be solved.
 
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Bitmap Frogs

Mr. Community
The crashes that occurred years ago appeared to be from a mistake in risk analysis leading to a design and training flaw…tragic mistake, but once you go back and reexamine everything for two years, should be good to go on that front.

MCAS is a critical system and it had a single point of failure (the angle of attack sensor). These need to be duplicated.

In order to camouflage it to avoid triggering pilot training they didn’t even have a switch to deactivate it - the only way was to turn off trim aid altogether.

This was not a failure of risk analysis, this was deliberate malfeasance. After the first crash the FAA sent a risk analysis to Boeing that this would happen on average every two years. And when the Ethiopian plane crashed, they still blamed the pilots.
 

HoodWinked

Member
Not sure if this is true but the fuselage is built and delivered by Spirit Aerospace but Boeing likely has to remove the doors to add trim and make other modifications so if it's a problem with quality control it would be on Boeing.

Otherwise do the bolts come loose on thier own. Maybe temperature cycling or pressure cycling or vibrations.
 

Embearded

Member
MCAS is a critical system and it had a single point of failure (the angle of attack sensor). These need to be duplicated.

In order to camouflage it to avoid triggering pilot training they didn’t even have a switch to deactivate it - the only way was to turn off trim aid altogether.

This was not a failure of risk analysis, this was deliberate malfeasance. After the first crash the FAA sent a risk analysis to Boeing that this would happen on average every two years. And when the Ethiopian plane crashed, they still blamed the pilots.
Boeing internally had written reports warning about MCAS since 2011 and they chose to ignore them.
They were forced to hand over emails and internal documents. The case is very well documented today and we know exactly what caused the death of those people:
Greed.
 

Thaedolus

Gold Member
MCAS is a critical system and it had a single point of failure (the angle of attack sensor). These need to be duplicated.

In order to camouflage it to avoid triggering pilot training they didn’t even have a switch to deactivate it - the only way was to turn off trim aid altogether.

This was not a failure of risk analysis, this was deliberate malfeasance.
See the first part- lack of redundancy in a critical failure point- was where I thought this was a risk analysis failure. But if what you’re saying is true- that they recognized it and tried to work around it in that way- then yeah, shit. That’s diabolical. Just add the second sensor, dipshits
 

Embearded

Member
See the first part- lack of redundancy in a critical failure point- was where I thought this was a risk analysis failure. But if what you’re saying is true- that they recognized it and tried to work around it in that way- then yeah, shit. That’s diabolical. Just add the second sensor, dipshits
The knew before the accident.
They were informed by their engineers and at some point they even turned down the suggestion for audio alert in the cockpit that MCAS is triggered.

Boeing didn't want to inform the pilots about MCAS. They lied to FAA about the invasive nature of MCAS and FAA agreed to leave it out of the manual so pilots wouldn't know about it.
Then, they made MCAS 4 times more invasive than it already was to make take off stability better and they never told FAA.
 

Bolts in need of "additional tightening" have been found during inspections of Boeing 737 Max 9s, United Airlines has said.

That’s fucking insane. Just that caused this. Someone couldn’t be assed to do their job correctly and now this.
So luckily not a design flaw just incompetence which can be solved.
Loose bolts on the door.... Imagine the rest of the plane. Boeing is done. Garbage company. Until they change management, it's best to just fly only with Airbus.
 

Daneel Elijah

Gold Member
See the first part- lack of redundancy in a critical failure point- was where I thought this was a risk analysis failure. But if what you’re saying is true- that they recognized it and tried to work around it in that way- then yeah, shit. That’s diabolical. Just add the second sensor, dipshits
The story is quite crazy when you think about it hard. They were pressed by time and wanted to make the plane fast to stay close to Airbus. During test they found out that the plane was not acting like the 737 NG, the predecessor of the MAX, in some situations. Their solution: a software that would hide that from the pilots. Because if any pilot had to do some training to use the new plane, they had 1 million to pay per plane to one of their customers. They told stuff to the regulator, saying that it was no big deal, then make changes that they did not disclose to them that make it a really big deal. Namely making this stupid software able to control the plane a lot more than it should. No pilot knew of MCAS before the first crash, I think. Imagine finding yourself figthing against the plane, and it not moving as it should? That is what happened to the plane that crashed.
There is a good documentary on Netflix, but I really liked this one, on Youtube:

I recommend it if you want to know more about the 737 MAX problems.
 

EviLore

Expansive Ellipses
Staff Member

"
Aircraft models have no fatal events involving airline passengers:
  • Airbus: A220, A319neo, A320neo, A321neo, A340, A350, A380
  • Boeing: 717, 747-8, 787
  • Embraer: ERJ 135, ERJ 140, ERJ 145

Fatal crash rates per million flights​

ModelRateFlightsFLE*Events
Airbus A300**0.616.51M3.997
0.306.06M2.002
0.4612.57M5.9910
1.354.74M6.399
0.09119.010.5814
0.1910.26M1.992
0.4426.8M11.8615
0.5076.61M38.651
0.6258.29M36.4350
0.1579.60M11.9919
0.07100.3M7.1912
3.080.65M2.002
0.24238.84M58.483
1.0212.98M13.2326
0.068.42M0.502
0.2225.0M5.419
0.2820.0M5.506
0.1811.11M2.013
0.5862.59M36.4045
0.649.30M5.9115
0.372.79M1.023
0.2646.38M11.9418
UNKUNK3.385
UNKUNK3.104
0.3911.56M4.496
11.36​
0.09M​
1.00​
1​
0.0316.67M0.441
1.629.53M15.4521
0.1811.11M2.016
0.475.40M2.545
0.1911.2M2.103
** No longer in production
*** No longer in commercial service
 

"
Aircraft models have no fatal events involving airline passengers:
  • Airbus: A220, A319neo, A320neo, A321neo, A340, A350, A380
  • Boeing: 717, 747-8, 787
  • Embraer: ERJ 135, ERJ 140, ERJ 145

Fatal crash rates per million flights​

ModelRateFlightsFLE*Events
Airbus A300**0.616.51M3.997
0.306.06M2.002
0.4612.57M5.9910
1.354.74M6.399
0.09119.010.5814
0.1910.26M1.992
0.4426.8M11.8615
0.5076.61M38.651
0.6258.29M36.4350
0.1579.60M11.9919
0.07100.3M7.1912
3.080.65M2.002
0.24238.84M58.483
1.0212.98M13.2326
0.068.42M0.502
0.2225.0M5.419
0.2820.0M5.506
0.1811.11M2.013
0.5862.59M36.4045
0.649.30M5.9115
0.372.79M1.023
0.2646.38M11.9418
UNKUNK3.385
UNKUNK3.104
0.3911.56M4.496
11.36​
0.09M​
1.00​
1​
0.0316.67M0.441
1.629.53M15.4521
0.1811.11M2.016
0.475.40M2.545
0.1911.2M2.103
** No longer in production
*** No longer in commercial service
Insane number.

Also I'm 38 and I remember hearing about the Fokker 100 accidents when I was a kid:

  1. 31 October 1996; Transportes Aéreos Regionais (TAM) Fokker 100; PT-MRK; flight 402; São Paulo, Brazil: The aircraft banked sharply to the right and crashed into a residential area shortly after takeoff on a scheduled domestic flight from São Paulo to Rio de Janeiro. Evidence suggests that there was an uncommanded deployment of the thrust reverser on the right engine. All of the 90 passengers and six crew members were killed. Also killed were three people on the ground.
    TAM crashes


  2. 9 July 1997; Transportes Aéreos Regionais (TAM) Fokker 100; PT-WHK; flight 283; near São Jose dos Campos, Brazil: The aircraft was on a scheduled domestic flight from São Jose dos Campos to São Paulo and experienced an explosion shortly after takeoff in the rear of the passenger cabin, blowing one passenger out of the aircraft. The explosion was of undetermined origin and blew out about a 10 by 5 foot (3 by 1.5 meter) section of the right rear of the fuselage. One passenger died as a result of either the explosion or the 7900 foot (2400 meter) fall. Six of the 54 other passengers were injured, and none of the five crew members were killed.
    TAM Airlines plane crashes


  3. 15 September 2001; TAM Linhas Aéreas Fokker 100; PT-MRNs; flight 9755; near Belo Horizonte, Brazil: The aircraft was on a scheduled domestic flight from Recife to São Paulo when the right engine of the aircraft broke up while in cruise at around 30,000 feet (9,140 meters) while enroute from Recifie to São Paulo. Pieces of the engine shattered two cabin windows and caused a cabin depressurization. None of the six crew members were killed, but one of the 82 passengers was killed as a result of the depressurization.
    TAM Airlines plane crashes

The first one was absolutely horrible stuff.

 
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Happosai

Hold onto your panties

"
Aircraft models have no fatal events involving airline passengers:
  • Airbus: A220, A319neo, A320neo, A321neo, A340, A350, A380
  • Boeing: 717, 747-8, 787
  • Embraer: ERJ 135, ERJ 140, ERJ 145

Fatal crash rates per million flights​

ModelRateFlightsFLE*Events
Airbus A300**0.616.51M3.997
0.306.06M2.002
0.4612.57M5.9910
1.354.74M6.399
0.09119.010.5814
0.1910.26M1.992
0.4426.8M11.8615
0.5076.61M38.651
0.6258.29M36.4350
0.1579.60M11.9919
0.07100.3M7.1912
3.080.65M2.002
0.24238.84M58.483
1.0212.98M13.2326
0.068.42M0.502
0.2225.0M5.419
0.2820.0M5.506
0.1811.11M2.013
0.5862.59M36.4045
0.649.30M5.9115
0.372.79M1.023
0.2646.38M11.9418
UNKUNK3.385
UNKUNK3.104
0.3911.56M4.496
11.36​
0.09M​
1.00​
1​
0.0316.67M0.441
1.629.53M15.4521
0.1811.11M2.016
0.475.40M2.545
0.1911.2M2.103
** No longer in production
*** No longer in commercial service
Models like the 747-100/200/300 are some of the earliest of the fleet and most are retired at this point. I point this out because that 1-rate may scare some. They (the early 747s) were documented by cases spanning nearly half-a-century.
However, I've never seen anything like rate & FLE of the Max. When there were the 3 incidents (probably more) with MCAS (2 of which were fatal); that's when the fleet should have been pulled from all ordering charters stat. Yet, once 2020 passed...Boeing slipped these back in and MCAS supposedly fixed but numerous more concerning issues with the engineering. In short, the Max was rushed into production due to Boeing's pressure to compete with Airbus and once problems were visible -- they weren't willing to pull these things out due to the billions invested.

Over 200 737 MAX are in service and probably more which had been ordered. I'd like to track what flight paths are most frequent for those in operation likewise.
 

Ownage

Member

"
Aircraft models have no fatal events involving airline passengers:
  • Airbus: A220, A319neo, A320neo, A321neo, A340, A350, A380
  • Boeing: 717, 747-8, 787
  • Embraer: ERJ 135, ERJ 140, ERJ 145

Fatal crash rates per million flights​

ModelRateFlightsFLE*Events
Airbus A300**0.616.51M3.997
0.306.06M2.002
0.4612.57M5.9910
1.354.74M6.399
0.09119.010.5814
0.1910.26M1.992
0.4426.8M11.8615
0.5076.61M38.651
0.6258.29M36.4350
0.1579.60M11.9919
0.07100.3M7.1912
3.080.65M2.002
0.24238.84M58.483
1.0212.98M13.2326
0.068.42M0.502
0.2225.0M5.419
0.2820.0M5.506
0.1811.11M2.013
0.5862.59M36.4045
0.649.30M5.9115
0.372.79M1.023
0.2646.38M11.9418
UNKUNK3.385
UNKUNK3.104
0.3911.56M4.496
11.36​
0.09M​
1.00​
1​
0.0316.67M0.441
1.629.53M15.4521
0.1811.11M2.016
0.475.40M2.545
0.1911.2M2.103
** No longer in production
*** No longer in commercial service
The 787 is a great plane. Always love flying it.
 

Happosai

Hold onto your panties
The 787 is a great plane. Always love flying it.
Likewise, jumbo and amazing if you get a wing seat to see the span of those up close. I believe this was one of Boeing's last great planes. That's where they should have thought when engineering Max...

Different generation though. I know one of the many engineers who worked on the Dreamliner and he's moved on from Boeing some years now.
 

poppabk

Cheeks Spread for Digital Only Future
Saw this on the news this morning.

I'm glad everyone is safe, but the sad part is I'm not surprised. All I ever hear is that airline manufacturers are cutting costs.

"Statistically the safest way to travel" might not mean as much is things aren't kept in check. How on Earth does a door fly off? My first guess is improper maintenance.
It's still waaaaay safer than driving. Ever wonder why they let you have a baby sit on your lap for free. It's not safe, if anything happens to the plane that baby will be bouncing around like a beach ball. But it is still much safer than just the chance of a parent choosing to drive instead.
 

Thaedolus

Gold Member
The story is quite crazy when you think about it hard. They were pressed by time and wanted to make the plane fast to stay close to Airbus. During test they found out that the plane was not acting like the 737 NG, the predecessor of the MAX, in some situations. Their solution: a software that would hide that from the pilots. Because if any pilot had to do some training to use the new plane, they had 1 million to pay per plane to one of their customers. They told stuff to the regulator, saying that it was no big deal, then make changes that they did not disclose to them that make it a really big deal. Namely making this stupid software able to control the plane a lot more than it should. No pilot knew of MCAS before the first crash, I think. Imagine finding yourself figthing against the plane, and it not moving as it should? That is what happened to the plane that crashed.
There is a good documentary on Netflix, but I really liked this one, on Youtube:

I recommend it if you want to know more about the 737 MAX problems.

Thanks for posting this, some stuff I misremembered or never even knew about
 

The noose is quickly tightening here for Boeing. I'm not sure how we can trust the airworthiness of any 737 MAX if we do find out this was a systematic problem with assembly at Spirit and Boeing, I wonder what else was made hastily and with slipshod quality on those planes?
 
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