You couldn't be more wrong, the founders original protagonist was Parliament, they pleaded for the king to step in and deliver relief and justice. The founders turned on the king when it became apparent he wouldn't interfere, Jefferson's declaration was intended to do that as was the writings of Thomas Paine.
On to the founders views of the legislative branch I would direct you to federalist paper 48
"The legislative department is everywhere extending the sphere of its activity, and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex." - James Madison.
You're placing your feelings and cynical views into the mindset of the founders, the purpose of the senate is to muzzle tyranny and prevent monistic thought, it wasn't created merely to protect the landed wealthy interests.
If your interested in Madison's views of the senate, read federalist paper 62.
I'm not remotely wrong. With few exceptions (e.g., Alexander Hamilton), your contention that the founders feared the legislative branch more than the executive is preposterous and without any historical support. Federalist 48 is about "checks and balances," and the benefits thereof. You would do well to understand the Federalist Papers rather than merely pulling out isolated sentences. It is, of course, historically clear that following the American revolution, the various state governments (independent nations) greatly diminished (practically to the point of non-existence in some cases) executive authority and fully empowered their legislatures. It is this that Madison is remarking upon, in the context of the necessity of checks and balances to prevent tyranny generally:
Will it be sufficient to mark, with precision, the boundaries of these departments, in the constitution of the government, and to trust to these parchment barriers against the encroaching spirit of power? This is the security which appears to have been principally relied on by the compilers of most of the American constitutions. But experience assures us, that the efficacy of the provision has been greatly overrated; and that some more adequate defense is indispensably necessary for the more feeble, against the more powerful, members of the government. The legislative department is everywhere extending the sphere of its activity, and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex.
While Madison is arguing in defense of a stronger executive, this is only necessary in the first place because of how much power had been taken from the branch and placed in the hands of fully empowered legislatures in the various state constitutions and Articles of Confederation (which had no executive at all--even the idea of a council appointed by Congress had been rejected). So while it might be correct to say that Madison argued for a stronger executive, this was not relative to the
British monarchy but to the
reaction to it by the new states. Because there remained intense fear of executive power, Madison had to explain that there could be benefits in placing
some power in an independent executive. The executive branch proposed by the Constitution was still incredibly weak by any standard other than not having one at all.
Madison's argument is itself revealing. The way that he tries to argue that a legislature should not be completely unchecked by any other branch is by
equating a fully-empowered legislature to a powerful executive:
The founders of our republics have so much merit for the wisdom which they have displayed, that no task can be less pleasing than that of pointing out the errors into which they have fallen. A respect for truth, however, obliges us to remark, that they seem never for a moment to have turned their eyes from the danger to liberty from the overgrown and all-grasping prerogative of an hereditary magistrate, supported and fortified by an hereditary branch of the legislative authority. They seem never to have recollected the danger from legislative usurpations, which, by assembling all power in the same hands, must lead to the same tyranny as is threatened by executive usurpations.
So, as you can see, it is executive usurpation that is the primary concern, and Madison had his work cut out for him merely to explain the benefits of placing even any semblance of real power in that branch. This was the point of Federalist 48: to explain the enhanced executive power contained in the proposed constitution, but enhanced relative to
nothing. You cannot turn this argument into one that the founders (and Americans generally) were somehow pro-executive and anti-legislative. Federalist 48 itself disproves that contention. (Plus, you may be the first person I have ever seen even attempt to make it.)
No, the senate is meant to be more deliberative and to prevent the aspirations of the momentary majority.
George Washington referred to it as "the saucer to cool the houses tea".
Again, saying that something was intended is not an argument that it is good. And, again, intending that something be "more deliberative" is not intending that it be supermajoritarian. Plus, we've already established that Madison viewed the Senate to be "more deliberative" in the sense of acting to protect the opulent minority from "too much" popular democracy.
